Software Vault: The Gold Collection/Software Vault - The Gold Collection (American Databankers) (1993).ISO/cdr11/clin0610.zip/ZQ000020.TXT

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                           THE WHITE HOUSE

                    Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________


                         BACKGROUND BRIEFING
                                 BY
                   SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL


                            June 4, 1993

                          The Briefing Room


3:05 P.M. EDT


         MR. STEINBERG:  Here we go.  Stephanopoulos, eat your
heart out.  (Laughter.)  You have in your hands a statement by the
President announcing new sanctions on Haiti.  I'm pleased to be able
to introduce to you two senior administration officials.  This is a
BACKGROUND BRIEFING.  I will introduce them.  [Names deleted].

         This is a BACKGROUND BRIEFING.  They may be referred to
as Senior Administration Officials.  And I'd like to introduce --
there is no sound or camera.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you.  Guess you
guys are reading it as I speak, but this is to get it on the
transcript.  It's a statement by the President on sanctions against
Haiti.

         One of the cornerstones of our foreign policy is to
support the global march towards democracy and to stand by the
world's new democracies.  Promotion of democracy, which not only
reflects our values but also increases our security, is especially
important in our own hemisphere.  As part of that goal, I consider it
a high priority to return democracy to Haiti and to return its
democratically-elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide to his
office.

         We should recall Haiti's strides toward democracy just a
few years back.  Seven years ago, tired of the exploitative rule that
had left them the poorest nation in our hemisphere, the Haitian
people rose up and forced the dictator Jean Claude Duvalier to flee.
In December of 1990, in a remarkable exercise of democracy, the
Haitian people held a free and fair election and two-thirds of them
voted for President Aristide.  Nineteen months ago, however, that
progress towards democracy was thwarted when the Haitian military
illegally and violently ousted President Aristide from office.

         Since taking office in January, the United States
government had worked steadily with the international community in an
effort to restore President Aristide and democracy to Haiti.  The OAS
and the United Nations Special Envoy Dante Caputo has demonstrated
great dedication and tenacity.  To support Mr. Caputo's effort
Secretary of State Christopher, in March, named Ambassador Lawrence
Pezzullo as our Special Advisor for Haiti.

         We in the international community have made progress.
The presence of the international civilian mission has made a
concrete contribution to human rights in Haiti.  Mr. Caputo's
consultations with all the parties indicated that a negotiated
solution is possible.  Unfortunately, the parties in Haiti have not
been willing to make the decisions or take the steps necessary to
begin democracy's restoration.  And while they seek to shift
responsibility, Haiti's people continue to suffer.  In light of their
own failure to act constructively, I had determined that the time had
come to increase the pressure on the Haitian military, the de facto
regime in Haiti, and their supporters.

         The United States has been at the forefront of the
international community's efforts to back up the United Nations and
the Organization of American States negotiations with sanctions and
other measures.  Beginning in October 1991, we froze all Haitian
government assets in the United States and prohibited unlicensed
financial transactions with Haitian persons.

         Today I am acting to strengthen those existing
provisions in several ways.  First, I have signed a proclamation
pursuant of Section 2-12-F of the Immigration and Nationality Act
prohibiting the entry into the United States of Haitian nationals who
impede the progress of negotiations designed to restore
constitutional government to Haiti, and of the immediate relatives of
such persons.

         The Secretary of State will determine the persons whose
actions are impeding a solution to the Haitian crisis.  These people
will be barred from entering the United States.

         Second, pursuant to the authority of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act and the executive orders on the Haiti
emergency, I have directed the Secretary of Treasury to designated as
specially designated nationals those Haitians who act for or on
behalf of the junta, or who make material, financial or commercial
contributions to the de facto regime or the Haitian armed forces.  In
effect, this measure will freeze the personal assets of such persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and bar them from conducting any
transactions whatsoever with individuals and entities named.

         Third, I have directed Secretary Christopher to consult
with the OAS and its member states on ways to enhance enforcement of
the existing OAS sanctions program.  And I have directed Secretary
Christopher and Ambassador Albright to consult with the United
Nations and member states on the possibility of creating a worldwide
sanctions program against Haiti.

         Sanctions alone do not constitute a solution.  The
surest path toward the restoration of democracy in Haiti is a
negotiated solution that assures the safety of all parties.  We will,
therefore, strongly support a continuation and intensification of the
negotiating effort.  We will impress on all the parties a need to
take seriously their own responsibilities for a successful resolution
to this impasse.

         Our policy in Haiti is not a policy for Haiti alone.  It
is a policy in favor of democracy everywhere.  To those who seek to
derail a return to constitutional government, whether in Haiti or
Guatemala, they must realize that we will not be swayed from our
purpose.

         At the same time, individuals should not have to fear
that supporting democracy's restoration will ultimately put their own
safety at risk.  Those who have opposed President Aristide in the
past should recognize that once President Aristide has returned, we
and the rest of the international community will defend assiduously
their legitimate political rights.

         It is my hope that the measures we have announced today
will encourage greater effort and flexibility in the negotiations to
restore democracy and President Aristide to Haiti.

         That's the end of the President's statement.  We'd be
happy to take questions.

         Q      Can you give us some idea of how many people would
fit into either of these categories, and give us some idea of who
these people are?  Are they just people in the government or people
who support the government?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think -- well, we
have both the visa category and the -- or, we say visas, but it's
really barring entry into the United States regardless of people's
past visa status.  And then the assets control status.

         I can say -- and I'll let my colleague amplify on this
in a moment -- that what we're looking at initially, we've gone after
the top leadership in the de facto regime and in the top of the Army.
And those are the names you'll see on the list today, plus some key
private sector supporters that have been acting on behalf of these
people.

         Support -- I should be very clear on this -- that
support in sort of a political or ideological sense isn't what gets
you on one of these lists.  It's material support, acting as an
agent, taking specific actions that put yourself in the position of
helping the de facto regime to blockade a return of constitutional
rule.

         I also should be clear that this group that I mentioned
initially is just the start.  There is a limit to how many names you
can punch into a computer at a single time.  And we are -- it's an
ongoing process.  More will be added, both as time permits and as the
evidence of activity on their part warrants.

         Q      So you've got 100 or 500 or --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me comment on the
financial sanction side of blocking of assets and prohibiting
transactions.

         Today, we've issued the general notice number one, which
is available at the offices of the Foreign Assets Control of the
Treasury in the lobby at 701 Madison Place.  They're available after
this meeting.  It's just right across Lafayette Square --Pennsylvania
Avenue and Madison Place -- announcing the name of 35 entities and 83
individuals who have been so determined to fit on this list.

         To give you a breakout, of these individuals, of the 83
-- 29 are in the military, 52 are in the civilian organizations, two
are private individuals of the entities.  There are four banks, 13
ministries, four military entities, and 14 a variety of other
government agencies and parastatal organizations.

         I would follow up on what my colleague has said.  This
is the first tranche of names that we're looking at.  We are actively
working on other names to get the evidentiary material together of
individuals who have materially supported the junta economically,
commercially, or otherwise contributed substantially to their
financial well-being.

         Q      How much money or worth in terms of assets are you
talking about freezing?  In other words, what's there and how often
do these 83 individuals or their families come to the United States?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me say a number of
these individuals have residences located in the United States.  A
number of these individuals have personal and corporate property.  To
the extent that these individuals own this private property, that is
blocked as well.  The residences are blocked.  All bank accounts are
blocked.  We'll have a better fix on the bank accounts after the
notice goes out through the Federal Reserve system and all of our
traditional banking contacts.  That is on the wire.  It is out.
These assets are blocked.

         But it's not just blocking of assets that has to be
stressed here.  It's the prohibition of transactions.  If you will,
these individuals and entities are now economically isolated in their
individual capacity from conducting any transactions of any nature
whatsoever with the United States or with United States persons.  So
not only are they prohibited from coming to the United States and
conducting a financial transaction, all of their property here is
blocked, not just their liquid assets -- personal and private
property as well; transactions with them are prohibited.

         Q      How long does it actually take for the notice to go
out for someone no longer to have access to a particular bank account
if they're on the list?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Okay, now, when you get
this information you'll pick in our lobby, which, again, is right
across the street, you'll see the name, the address, personal
identifiers and so forth.  This information has gone out over wire,
through the banking system.  We rely on the financial institutions to
immediately put that into the computers and to block these accounts.
Physically how long it takes I can't tell you.  But this is a tested
device we've used in other programs like Iraq, Libya, Cuba and
Serbia.  We've effectively used this and it's our belief -- we're
certainly working under the presumption that this will happen today.

         Q      Do you really think that this step should be an act
for force junta to step down?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think -- I'll let my
colleague answer on his part -- I think in terms of what we're doing
here, I think they are very significant steps in identifying the
junta supporters and economically isolating them from the United
States.

         Q      But why did the administration wait four months to
take this step which would seem quite obvious, I would say?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me hit upon that,
because I think one point that's made in the President's statement is
very important to keep in mind, and that is sanctions are a tactic.
They're a tool to try to accomplish a goal.  They're not a goal in
themselves.  And our goal here is a negotiated solution.  That's what
we've been working on for the last four months.  And we have made
substantial progress in that area.  We've got the U.N.-OAS negotiator
track energized even during the transition.  We got Ambassador
Pezzullo energized to give added impetus to the negotiations.  They
had a success in setting up the international civilian mission, as is
mentioned in the statement.

         And what's been happening over the last several months
has been steady progress in the negotiations.  This is not just a
static situation.  What, I think, you can see triggered this was that
we had reached a point where the framework of a solution was visible
and the parties all seemed to, more or less, be on board with it.

         The first step of this process was to get the
international civilian police and military construction and training
personnel into Haiti -- something that had been requested by both
sides as a confidence builder in the process of a transition back to
democratic government.  When it came time to take that step -- and
this is what is being referred to in the statement -- the de facto
regime and the military backed away from something that they had said
that they had wanted.

         So the purpose of the sanctions is to -- it's not just
that somehow magically by themselves they're going to result in a
solution or cause them to step down.  What we're trying to cause them
to do is to negotiate seriously, to come back to the table, take a
serious approach and resolve the issue.  But the message here is if
you engage in dilatory tactics, if you engage in rhetorical exercise
and not in serious negotiations, there is going to be a very strong
reaction.

         I would note also that we're talked here about the U.S.
part of this, the measures barring entry into the U.S. and the very
strong measures on the business front.  And I think it bears
repeating what my colleague was saying:  This is not just whatever
assets. you happened to have here, but you can't do business with any
-- and your companies can't do business -- but also the international
stuff.  The OIS sanctions -- we're going to Managua tomorrow with the
Deputy Secretary.  There's a meeting of foreign ministers on Haiti on
Sunday that the Organization of American States is holding.  And
we're going to be making efforts, and  we have reason to believe
there is support for this, to increase the effort to bring about
compliance with the OAS sanctions program.  It's a very strong and
broad program on paper.  There's been some gaps in it and we're going
to work to try to tighten that up.

         Second, we've already started consultations with the
U.N. and member states about a U.N. worldwide sanctions program.  So
this is the beginning, not the end of this program.  And the message
is it will get worse unless you get serious about negotiations.

         Q      Including an oil embargo?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Could include an oil
embargo.  That's certainly one of the measures under consideration.

         Q         proposed on Wednesday a military blockade of
Haiti.  On what grounds does this administration refuse such a step,
if it refuses?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, he was talking,
if I -- this I'm taking from press stories -- about a military
enforcement of a U.N. sanctions program.  You can't stop other
countries' ships on the high seas without some kind of agreed U.N.
sanctions program or mandatory sanctions program.  So that's another
possibility in that context for sure.

         Q      What's the position of the administration on that
point?  Is that a possibility?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  It's a possibility,
yes.  We're consulting with our friends and allies in the United
Nations on the design of a U.N. sanctions program, and that would be
one of the possible measures on the enforcement side.  The oil the
other gentleman mentioned is one of the possible measures on the
scope side.  I think we shouldn't project or predict what the outcome
of that is going to be.  That's why we're consulting with our
colleagues.

         Q      How many individuals are being barred travel?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  At the moment it's more
or less the same list of names, although I think there will be
the same list of names, although I think there will be more added
tomorrow.  This is, again, an on-going process.  So you're probably
talking 100 or so at the outset, plus families -- that's 100
principles.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  At the moment it's more
or less the same list of names, although I think there will be
more added tomorrow.  This is, again, an ongoing process.  So you're
probably talking 100 or so at the outset, plus families -- that's 100
principals.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me also mention on
the travel side -- not only is there the visa aspect of this, but
there are these individuals named on the Treasury list.  These
individuals not only would need a visa, but they would need a license
to conduct economic transactions in the United States.  Without it
their travel would also be barred.

         Q      Everyone on your list, we can say that applies as
well to the people who cannot travel to the United States, right?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  That's right, yes.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  And it -- my -- the
standards are slightly different for the assets control and the visa,
or the entry proclamation, and so the list may roll more rapidly on
one side than the other because of the different evidentiary
standards.

         Q      Over the past 20 months we've heard a lot of
arguments that the reason why the State Department and Treasury
didn't take these actions beforehand was because of legal concerns
that you had.  And do you feel confident that you -- you have a legal
basis for denying access to the United States and the assets freeze?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Take those separately?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes.

         Q      If you were a friend of the junta, one people on
the list and you've been reading the papers at all, you've probably
moved your liquid assets out of the United States or you may have.
But you probably couldn't have sold your house.  What will actually
happen to residences?  Will they be seized by U.S. government --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  They'll be determined
as blocked property.  A notice that it's blocked property will be
posted on the door.  All transactions with that property -- for
example, it couldn't be transferred, title couldn't be sold --

         Q      They could continue to live there?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Not without a license
from the Treasury Department.  And we would take efforts to bring
enforcement actions against that particular property, as we have --

         Q      And that would happen when -- immediately?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Within the immediate,
near future.

         Q      Are any of these people presently in the U.S.?  And
if so, what do you do if you find them?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Frankly, that
information is still coming in.  If we find them, if we have them,
they'll be -- their economic transactions will be prohibited without
a license -- get a license literally to do all transactions.

         Q      What about these economic transactions?  Is the
administration opening itself up to any charge here that once again
the sanctions are being tightened and ultimately it's going to hurt
the people of Haiti when you're really trying to get negotiations
going in a positive way?  I'm thinking now specifically of a possible
oil embargo.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, on that sanctions
that have been done today, I think you can see they are very much
targeted on specific individuals who are not the people of Haiti in
general.  Oil embargo, yes, as would the existing trade sanctions.
Trade sanctions are blunt instrument.  Nobody can say that you can be
surgical about it.  So when you take measures of this kind,
unfortunately it does have adverse impact on innocent people as well
as on the guilty one.  The question is, can you design it in such a
way that it brings about the result you're seeking in a rapid manner.
This is -- again, it's not a measure that's designed to simply be
punitive, it's a measure that's designed to bring about a result,
which is a negotiated solution which would end the political crisis
and improve the lot of everyone in Haiti.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  If I might just follow
up on that for one second.  In your statement that this has hit a
wide net of individuals, this is a targeting of key individuals who
specifically are identified as materially or financially supporting
the junta -- either working for it, making financial contributions,
brokering or arranging deals on its behalf.  So if you will, this is
the finest tuning of targeting these sanctions to specific named
individuals so that it doesn't have that effect you're speaking of --
hitting the wider public.

         Q      How long will you be willing to wait for these
particular sanctions to take effect before you might consider another
shoe to drop?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I think, as the
statement indicates, we're actively moving on the international front
now.  So this is -- we're not waiting on some shoe to drop.  The
consultations with the U.N. on worldwide sanctions are going forward
sort of regardless of what happens with the individuals or the
unilateral sanctions we've taken today.  We're also moving in the OAS
to torque up their sanctions.  So I think the message there is the
sanctions are going forward.  The way to stop them is to negotiate
seriously and bring about a result.  It's not time for talking about
the possibility of negotiating anymore, it's time to do it.

         Everybody knows what it's going to take to bring this
crisis to an end, but people have to take the decisions and they have
to take the steps to carry it out.  And there's not going to be --and
I think what this shows, and it goes back in a way to the legal
question, the President took a very significant step here in that he
made this proclamation which has opened up a whole new legal area at
least on the entry side that didn't exist before.  I think that
reflects both the depth of his own personal commitment to making this
work and the sense that now is the time when if we can let people
understand that there is no way out of this crisis other than to do
what they all realize needs to be done in terms of a negotiated
solution that brings back a constitutional government and President
Aristide.  That's the message and --

         Q      You said this worked before in what Syria, Cuba,
Iraq and Libya?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I've said we've used
naming of names in a variety of countries:  Panama, Cuba, Iraq,
Libya, Serbia.

         Q      What were the results?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We are -- those are
on -- mostly are ongoing programs, and we believe the results are
significant in terms of identifying key individuals responsible for
financial transactions.

         Let me follow up on that for a second.  As far as the
results here, this is the first step of naming key individuals who
are materially or financially contributing to the junta.  We
anticipate the results will be felt.  We anticipate that this is a
significant step toward tightening this sanctions program.

         Q      But did it get these people to be more cooperative
in these other countries?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I would just say
generally yes, it has been a very effective tool in continuing to
wage economic sanctions.

         Q      These steps are aimed basically at the military
junta who backed away from the idea of the 500-man international
police force.  But President Aristide also backed away from that
idea.  Is there any thought of any kind of measures to increase the
pressure on him to be more flexible in negotiations?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I think it's
inherent in the situation that for a negotiated solution, both sides
have to be willing to compromise, both sides have to be willing to be
reasonable.  But in this case, the parties who created the problem in
the first place are the military and the de facto regime who broke
the constitutional process and acted illegally.  If they wanted to
increase the pressure on President Aristide, they have it in their
power.  All they need to do is start behaving reasonably and come to
the table.  But I think the pressure is on them to come forward.

         Then if there's something found wanting on the other
side, obviously -- I think that, though we want to keep our focus
where it belongs, which is on the people who created this problem in
the first place and the people who have perpetuated the problem by
not coming forward, rather than to getting into whether or not one
party before the other accepted a particular position in a
negotiation.  Our problem is not President Aristide.  Our problem is
the illegal regime that has blocked a return to constitutional rule.

         Q      Why do you believe the regime backed away from the
agreement?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I guess I would ask
them.  It's a good question, and one that should be put to them.
They didn't have much of an explanation for it.  So we're dealing
with what they do rather than what they say.

         Q      Do you doubt their overall seriousness of these
negotiations?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  You have to doubt the
seriousness of someone who tells you that certain types of guarantees
and processes are important to them and to their constituents to make
a process work, and then when you produce those, they run away from
it -- another reason for being more concerned with their position
than with that of the President.  This was something that was their
-- or where they had the prime interest.  The President also was
interested in the subject as well.  But when someone backs away from
their own proposal, you do have to doubt their seriousness.

         Q      You mentioned specifically of barring sales of
residences and things of that sort.  Beyond that, can you give us
some examples of the kind of transactions you're talking about
blocking here, and the kind of individual -- type of individual that
would be making --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Again, assets of these
named individuals within the United States are blocked, as in our
other programs that I mentioned earlier.  Not only are the assets
blocked, transactions by U.S. persons with them, organizations which
they own in their personal capacity are prohibited.  So for example,
if sales of goods are being made to businesses owned by these
individuals, that is now prohibited.  Any outstanding licenses will
be reviewed as to who's the beneficial or actual owner of these
companies, and those will be revoked.

         The bottom line here is that as a financial matter, all
financial relations between these named individuals and the United
States -- this is a country that had a major trading relationship
with the United States going into this coup -- are now prohibited.
These individuals, from a financial standpoint, are cut off.

         If I might, let me read a few of the key names that are
here --

         Q      I was going to ask you for that, and I was going to
ask you what rough estimate of what sort of dollar volume in flow
you're talking about.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me say to go out
and poll with every conceivable financial institution before taking
such action would pretty much be a tipoff that we're taking this
action.  We have a notification system in place that's sophisticated
enough that I believe that by today all relevant financial
institutions in the key areas where these individuals may have
property will be notified and will be -- have a duty to block these
entities.

         As far as residences and addresses, I can tell you our
phones are very busy of information coming in, our analysts are
working to develop this information as far as personal residences.
That's something that is going to emerge.  We will take action when
it becomes available.  I think the key here is the additional steps
that will be taken.  As a practical matter, these individuals are
paying a very real price for the support of the junta.

         Q      It's that price that I'm trying to get towards a
little bit here.  I would assume that you all wouldn't have done this
without having some idea as to what sort of dollar flow in trade
you're blocking.  You wouldn't do it for a couple of thousand dollars
worth of flow back and forth, you'd do it for something significant.
And I'm trying to get an idea as to what it is.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think you're right
about that.  I believe these are significant.  But also, I think the
importance here is the long-term economic relationship or the
possibility of an economic relationship is no longer there for these
named individuals so long as they're in support of the junta.

         Q      Are you saying you don't have a dollar figure or
you don't want to give a dollar figure?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We have a rough dollar
estimate.  I cannot give you a dollar figure this afternoon.

         Q      Why?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I don't have that
figure that I can give you.  We will go out and we will do a census
immediately.  The banks will report back to us instantly, within the
next several days when they have bought an account.  They have a duty
to give us a report from it.  Let me say, within a period of a week
or so we will begin developing the amounts that are blocked here.
But again, I fear that you're focusing on the asset side more than
the transaction side, and it's the loss of possibility of future
financial relations that's really key here.  Businesses owned no
longer can conduct transactions with any U.S. persons.  So if you're
in the business --

         Q      I think I understand that but --

         Q      We sell them petroleum products, we sell them
tires.  And we're trying to get at that --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No, I can't give you an
exact analysis as to what we have.  I don't have it right now.

         Let me give you the names, and I think perhaps that will
help you define it.  Marc Bazin, prime minister; Clifford Brandt,
president and director general, Banque De L'Union Haitienne; Raoul
Cedras, chief of staff, Haitian Armed Forces; Bonivert Claude,
governor general, Central Bank; Yonel "Son Son" Elysee, businessman.
And then two banks in particular:  the Banque De La Republique
D'Haiti, which, of course, is the central bank; and the Banque de
L'Union Haitienne, which is a private bank.

         Q      Do you have any indication that any of those
individuals you just named have assets in the United States that will
be affected?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes.

         Q      Which ones?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me say, any answer
I'd give you right now is complete.  What I'd like to be able to do
is get a call-back from you within the next coming weeks and be able
to give you a more precise answer.  Traditionally, that's not the way
we do it.  We take the blocking action, and the legal responsibility
is on the holder of those assets.  In our experience of blocking
assets for all of the programs, we do not do a survey of what we're
blocking before we do it lest we tip off the holder and the party
that is the named party on the account.

         Q         any consultation or negotiations going on with
other countries, specifically France and Canada, which has direct
financial links with Haiti, to undertake similar blocking actions or
transactions?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Before he starts, let
me say we have routine consultations with all of our allies on
economic sanctions matters.  Should that come about, we certainly
have that mechanism in place.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes.  Let me say, each
country, of course, has different powers or lack thereof, but we have
been in consultation with, or begun consultation with the countries
you mentioned, as well as others, in the sense of creating an
international structure which would give everyone more authority to
take similar measures.  So we are urging other countries to do what
they can unilaterally as we are doing, but many of them don't have
the legal capacity to take the kinds of steps we do.  Some of them
find it easier to take some of the steps; some of them aren't able
to.

         Q      Specifically, does France and Canada have the sort
of legal mechanism that would allow --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Not so much on assets,
although with -- you know more about it than I do.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me comment on that.
We have worked through many of these multilateral sanctions programs
with allies -- France and Canada, among the many -- who are
developing the kinds of mechanisms we have.  Should it come to pass
that a program would be in place here, I am confident that other
countries could take actions as mandated by the U.N.

         Q      But you don't have it at the present time.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  In other programs, yes,
we do.  And we routinely consult on a regular basis with our
financial counterparts in various governments.  For example, on the
Serbia program, there are routine consultations.  On the Iraq
program, there were routine consultations.  On the Iraq program there
were routine consultations.  And to the extent of multilateral
sanctions on Libya, we routinely consult.  Should we have
multilateral financial sanctions here, I am assured we will begin
those similar consultations.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I would say, too, you
might speak to the government's concerns -- I hate to speak for them
-- but we have discussed these kinds of things.  And as I say, some
of them have some possibilities, for example, on the visa side where
it's easier for them than it is for us.  They don't have to take the
extraordinary measures that the President took today.  On the other
side, they have treaty obligations and so on that may be more
constrictive on the personal assets.  But the key there is, if you
get into a U.N. mechanism that will give them a lot -- or put them in
a position to take steps they may not have been in a position to do
already.

         Q      You don't know how many of these hundred or so
people have assets here?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Do I personally know
that?  No.  I think, though, the reason I suggested giving some of
the names is that you see on there people who have major business
interests in Haiti.  You see on there banks and so on.  It's hard to
conceive that those people and banks don't do transactions in the
United States and that it won't be a serious constraint on their
financial and economic well-being to have this kind of a penalty put
on them.  But how much they might have made had this not happened, I
have no idea.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  But let's not be
misleading about this.  I will tell you, we have a very good idea, we
have focused on the bank accounts of the individuals, their
whereabouts, and that becomes an investigative question which we are
following up on.  And in the coming days and weeks we will certainly
have a handle on it.

         Q      Two questions.  Have you found any evidence that
U.S.-based Haitians have been supporting the coup and will be
affected by this measure?  And --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me say on that
we're looking at all possibilities, and if that should come to pass
we will deal with that. But I can't reveal anything that may be under
investigation at this --

         Q      Are there any U.S.-based Haitians on your list
today?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No, they're all
Haitian-based, but some may have property in the United States.  Some
do have property in the United States.

         Q      And also, what do you see the effect of this will
be on the assembly industry in Haiti, which the Bush administration
carved a special exemption to protect?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Let me say, to the
extent that these individuals are importers, to the extent that these
individuals have a financial stake in the assembly sector, to the
extent that these individuals routinely trade with the United States,
that is now over.  Those economic transactions and that economic
possibility is no longer there.  Again, as we move down, there may be
others who are providing financial support, material support,
commercial support.  We will look to them as well.  So it may indeed
have an effect on the assembly sector.  However, the assembly sector
is not being targeted.  Supporters of the junta are the individuals
being supported.

         Q      But it's likely to have a devastating effect on the
assembly sector if that's a U.S.-oriented industry.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No.  It could have an
effect on the assembly sector, but it's not my knowledge or belief
that the assembly sector, per se, is providing the material support
to the junta that we've been talking about today.

         Q      What could you reply to a human rights group or
people like Reverend Jackson who said that the President should have
done more and faster than what he did?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, I think I
mentioned earlier that a lot has happened over the last several
months and have moved the negotiations forward and have moved the
human rights situation forward.  The presence of the International
Civilian Mission, which was one of the early accomplishments, has
done a lot towards improvement of human rights by increased
monitoring.  But now is the time that we feel we need to give that
extra push in the negotiations that the sanctions will provide.
I think everything has its own pace and you have to look at what was
done, what was the problem confronting the administration at the
beginning, what steps did it take, how much progress was made.  And
when we ran into a serious snag, when things stopped moving forward,
that's when you got these kind of actions.

         Q      These groups seem to think that it was a very slow
pace -- and that you could have been more forceful.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I don't want to
characterize what other groups think.  But I would go back to say
that sanctions are not an end in themselves.  They're a tool.  And
you use them to try to move forward a negotiating process.  You don't
do them just for the sake of doing them.  So the idea that we should
have done sanctions at some earlier point just to do sanctions, if
that's connected with some step that someone was proposing, then it's
a debatable subject.

         Q      Maybe not just to do sanctions, but to apply more
pressure earlier, to force these people to negotiate earlier,
because, in fact, they have been buying time constantly and they're
dragging their feet.  And other than the briefings we had in Little
Rock in January announcing a breakthrough and this is May -- end of
May -- this is June now and -- while this is more or less the same
situation.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Every negotiation has
its ups and downs.  I think, though, at the time you were talking
about there were -- concrete achievements have been made.  The
International Civilian Mission is a concrete achievement.  It got
people on the ground, it got more protection for people in Haiti.
There were achievements in the negotiation itself which stalled out
not long ago and provoked this kind of action.  You also have the
fact that -- your willingness to take these kinds of steps as a form
of pressure itself.

         It's not always the best tactic to use all of your tools
all at once at the beginning.  You use them in some kind of measured
way to try to keep driving the process forward.  I think the
commitment is there to make this thing move as rapidly as possible
and I think you can see from the statement that the President has
reiterated his own personal commitment to that and taking concrete
steps today to further it.  But it's not necessarily the fastest way
to move a negotiation to drop the atomic bomb at the beginning.  You
have to measure your steps to what's going on in the negotiations and
into what your assessments of different people's attitudes and
your own interests are.  And, you know, obviously that's a subject
that's endless debatable, but in this case, I think we feel very,
very comfortable that we've moved this thing very rapidly, and when
we hit a snag you're seeing the determination not to allow it to
stall out.  This is a sign that the administration intends to keep
this thing moving.

         Q      How soon would you say we could be able to see a
Security Council resolution be introduced on helping sanctions?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I don't want to try to
put time frames on things, but I just would say, this is moving
rapidly.  As I mentioned, the consultations that the President was
calling for here have already begun, and we're not talking endless
consultations.  I think you'll --

         Q      Are you talking days, weeks, months?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We're talking moving as
rapidly as we possible can.  And I don't mean that -- I don't want to
see some story saying, therefore I was evasive and it's going to be
slow.  I just learned long ago that when you start saying it's days
and then it's a week and a half, everybody says, gee, you misled me.
So this is a process that you'll be seeing out in the open very soon
in the U.N. and you can chart its progress there.  But the effort is
to move forward with the consultations, see what the feasibility with
this is, and move out smartly.

         Q      What specifically would an individual have to do to
get his name removed from the list?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I guess it partly
depends on the list, but Rick can talk about the assets.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  He would have to cease
his activities in support of the junta.

         Q      What specifically does that mean?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think -- let me say
this issue comes up in our other programs and it's something that's
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but we would have to be convinced
that he has materially altered  course of behavior, such that that
support is not longer with the junta.

         Q      And would have to come to you?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes.

         Q      On the visa sanctions, are we going to send anyone
out of the country -- if you're a student, if your children are a
student here or medical care?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We'll have to --
obviously, humanitarian considerations is the kind of thing where you
look to exceptions.  If there are people here -- and, again, because
we don't keep record of the visas, it takes a while to find who is
here -- it depends -- it gets into immigration law.  If you're a
legal permanent resident, you have more due process rights than if
you're not -- if you're here on a tourist visa or something.  But it
becomes an enforcement action for the INS.  If you find somebody here
who's on the list, out they go as rapidly as the process allows,
absent some humanitarian reason that might prevail in that case.

         Q      How would it work if you're trying to, like, bar
the sale of a house in Miami?  How would that work?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The property would be
blocked to sell the house.  A license would be needed.  If we did
allow the sale of the house, the proceeds would be placed into a
block to count.  This has, in past instances, this is something that
we have dealt with.  But that's basically how it would work.

         Q      Where would you intercede?  At what level would
Treasury intercede -- at the real estate agent, or --

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No, a notification to
the fact that the property is blocked -- we would intercede at the
property with a sign on the door with penalties imposed for anyone
removing the sign.

         Q      Excuse me, I would like to know if you have
confidence that this procedure of sanctions is going to obtain the
goal of getting the restoration of democracy in Haiti?  I am a little
pessimistic because I came to this country in 1959 from Cuba.  There
have been a lot of sanctions, a lot of pressure of Fidel leaving --
very good -- and by people suffering and dying in Cuba.  I think the
only thing that I think in my 34 years in this country that have been
effective is Johnson when he went to the    Dominican Republic;
Reagan, when he went to went to Grenada and Bush to Panama.  In the
Western Hemisphere, it doesn't work -- that happened.  The record is
there.   Sanctions for Fidel and the missile crisis.  You know,
something has to be done because these people in Haiti hate people
who don't respect the law and don't care for the humanity.

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I think, as I mentioned
earlier you have to look at sanctions as a tool and it's not
necessarily, it's not the only tool and it's in and of itself, it
doesn't produce a result.  The other method you imply of military
action is one that I think President Aristide himself has said he
doesn't want to see tried at this point.  So, the effort now is to
try to produce a serious negotiation that sanctions are one tool to
try to press in that direction, but no one is saying that is a
guaranteed result.  We're saying we're determined to get to that
result and we're going to use every tool we possibly can to
accomplish it.  But, again, sanctions alone is not a policy, it's a
tactic that you use in the course of carrying out a policy and a
strategy.

         Q      Will commercial air traffic continue?

         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  For the time being
there's no alteration in that.  As I mentioned, it's not that we
haven't looked at it; but for a unilateral effort on air traffic
you're simply making people make one stopover in the Dominican
Republic or something on their way to Miami; it doesn't have much
impact in its -- the inconvenience would be primarily on the American
citizens that travel that route and not on the people who are
creating the problem.  So, that's the current state of that.
Obviously, in a multilateral context that might be something you
would look at once again.

         THE PRESS:  Thank you.

                          END3:50 P.M. EDT